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NOISE AS A NUISANCE
WILLIAM H. LLOYDt
Some few years ago when giving that part of the course on Equity
Jurisprudence relating to torts, the writer gave an examination question
abstracted from a recent decision of the Court of Chancery of New Jersey.
It was the usual nuisance case: a complaint by an adjoining owner of noise,
dust and vibration. One student included in his answer the following state-
ment: "The test then is whether this conduct interferes with ordinary com-
fort, not according to some fanciful standard but according to the plain
and sober manners of an English gentleman." Such sturdy loyalty to the
home of the common law and one of its most estimable products
may have commendable elements in a chaotic world; but the deportment of
the English countryside seems a whimsical test to apply in a mill town of
northern New Jersey best known for bootleggers and communists. Never-
theless our student had the semblance of a thought: he was seeking to recall
an oft quoted dictum of Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce: ". . . ought this
inconvenience to be considered in fact as more than fanciful, more than
one of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially inter-
fering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence, not merely
according to elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but according
to plain and sober and simple notions among the English people?" I This
impressive dictum was quoted in Soltau v. DeHeld,2 a case read in course;
in fact, it has been referred to so frequently that a judge in a recent English
case expressed some gratification that they had got along without mention-
ing it. Our student was justified in recalling it, and his emendation may be
taken as a mild offset to Napoleon's sneer at the English as a nation of shop-
t A. B. 189o, M. A. 1893, LL. B. 1893, LL. M. 1933, University of Pennsylvania;
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; editor of casebooks in Equity
and Procedure; author of EARmy CouRTs OF PFNNSYLVANIA (igio), and of numerous arti-
cles in legal periodicals.
'Walters v. Selfe, 4 De G. & S. 315 (1851).
22 Sire. (N. S.) 133 ((851).
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keepers. Indeed, if gentlemen are as cheap as Sir Thomas Smith implies,
and include all who can live idly without manual labor,3 perhaps the emenda-
tion was not as commendatory as it seems. In fact, a proper sense of
humility would recommend the modest limitations indicated by the Supreme
Court of Washington: "The nuisance and discomfort must affect the
ordinary comfort of human existence as understood by the American people
in their present state of enlightenment." 4
In attempting to separate sound from other forms of nuisance and
discover if possible what kinds of complaints are likely to receive sympathetic
consideration from the courts, general statements, dicta, and definitions are
not very helpful. Nuisance, which means literally annoyance, may be
described as a wrong done to one by unlawfully disturbing him in the
enjoyment of his property or in the exercise of a common right.5 But the
term eludes exact definition because, as has been well said, "the controlling
facts are seldom alike, and each case stands on its own footing. We are
not aided by the classification into public and private nuisances, because
the difference between them does not depend on the nature of the thing
done, but on the fact that one affects the public at large and the other a
limited number only. . . The injury may be to person or property, to
health, comfort, safety or morality. It may be a crime." 6 What amount
of annoyance or inconvenience, then, will constitute a nuisance is largely a
question of degree; the injury of course must be real and substantial and
in the case of private nuisance must be such as to interfere materially with
ordinary physical comfort or the reasonable use of property. But what is
ordinary comfort to the "sober English people" or the Americans "in their
present state of enlightenment" ? In spite of the inclination of ultra modern-
ists to lift their eyebrows at cases, we must go to them for information:
they are, in fact, all we have, except a confused multitude of local ordinances
which tell us something about the kinds of petty annoyances that have pro-
voked restrictive community action, but nothing about the consensus of
opinion to which such restrictions may be attributed.
So far as private nuisance is concerned there is little to be learned from
the early reports that is of much value in solving the problems of the age
of mechanical invention. The cases deal, commonly, with injuries relating
I COMMONWEALTii OF ENGLAND (1583) Bk. I, c. 20. I BL. Comm. *406.
'Everett v. Paschall, 61 Wash. 47, 52, 1Ii Pac. 879, 881 (1910). See also Stevens v.
Rockport Granite Co., 216 Mass. 486, 1O4 N. E. 371 (1914); Attorney-General v. Dore-
mus, ii Del. Ch. 277, ioi Atl. 868 (1917); Kroecker v. Camden Coke Co., 82 N. J. Eq.
373, 88 Atl. 955 (1913).
,POLLOCK, TORTS (9th ed. 1912) 412; 21 Am. & ENG. ENC OF LAW (2d ed.) 682,
quoted in Johnson v. New York, 1O9 App. Div. 821, 96 N. Y. Supp. 754 (19o5).0 Melker v. New York, 19o N. Y. 481, 488, 83 N. E. 565, 567 (i9o8) ; District of Co-
lumbia v. Totten, 55 App. D. C. 312 (1925). See also City of Pana v. Washed Coal Co., 260
Ill. 11i, lO2 N. E. 992 (I913); Cumberland Corp. v. Metropoulos, 241 Mass. 491, 135 N. E.
693 (1922) ; Wier's Appeal, 74 Pa. 230 (1873)3 For the eminent domain cases see Notes
(19o6) I L. R. A. (N. s.) 49, (19o8) 17 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1054.
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to real property or its appurtenances, such as stopping or interfering with
rights of way, flooding the land by the diversion of waters or water courses,
or corrupting the air with noisome smells, so as to render one's dwelling
house unwholesome and uncomfortable.7 This last group may be regarded
as the forerunner of a well known line of decisions that have followed the
industrial revolution, which preserve and elaborate a principle found in the
early law that the fact that an occupation was commendable in itself and
carried on in a proper manner did not alone justify substantial damage to
property or the infliction of material discomfort upon residents of a neigh-
borhood. Such cases frequently present a complex of nuisances, noise,
smoke, dust, vibration and offensive odors; pleaders naturally make out as
dark a story as possible, although it is admitted that no particular combina-
tion of annoyances is essential.8 In this type of litigation noise is frequently
a factor, but not the only or indeed the leading factor in an accumulation of
disturbances. An effort will be made as far as possible in this survey to
confine the discussion to cases where noise was the sole or at least the pre-
dominant factor in inducing action by the court. For it is generally ad-
mitted that noise alone may constitute a nuisance, although in determining
whether it is in fact such a nuisance as to entitle the complaining party to
relief at law or in equity, the character, volume, time, place and duration
of its occurrence, as well as the locality, must be taken into consideration. 9
In examining the authorities in which industrial noises are considered
it is noticeable at once that few of the complaints involve the great plants
of nationally important heavy industries, as is not uncommon in the smoke
and gas cases. 10 Chemical fumes and smoke are annoying at greater dis-
tances than noise, and it is usual to find the larger plants situated in neigh-
borhoods fully industrialized or purposely placed in comparative isolation.
'7Batten's Case, 9 Co. 53 (16io); Aldred's Case, 9 Co. 57 (161o); Morley v. Prag-
nell, Cro. Car. 510 (1639); FrrzEERBERT, NAuRA Biaviur *183; 16 VINER, ABRIDGMENT
(ist ed. 1743) 26; I Co mYN, DIGEST (4th ed. 1793) 303; 3 Br- Comm. *216; I RoLLE,
ABRIDGMENT (1668) 88.
1 "Un tan house est necessary, car touts wear shoes; et uncore ceo poit estre pull down,
&c. si est erect al nusance l'auter; et issint de glass-house." Jones v. Powell, Palm. 536
(1628) ; Baltimore & P. R. R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 1O8 U. S. 317, 2 Sup. Ct. 719
(1883) ; Judson v. Los Angeles Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, io6 Pac. 581 (igio); Simon v. De-
troit Motor Valve Co., 233 Mich. 17, 2o6 N. W. 336 (1925); Davidson v. Isham, 9 N. J.
Eq. 186 (1854); Roessler, etc. Co. v. Doyle, 73 N. J. L. 521, 64 Atl. 156 (i9o6); Fish
v. Dodge, 4 Denio 311 (N. Y. 1847); Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas Light Co., 122 N. Y. IS,
25 N. E. 246 (i8go); Walters v. Selfe, 4 De G. & 5. 315 (1851); Banford v. Turnlcy,
3 B. & S. 66 (1862); St. Helens S. Co. v. Tipping, ii H. L. Cas. 642 (1865).
"Episcopo v. Olivere, 15 Del. Ch. 22o, 135 Atl. 482 (1926) ; Damadio v. Levinsohn, iiI
N. J. Eq. 84, 161 Atl. 504 (1932) ; Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 576 (1878) ; Stevens v. Rock-
port Granite Co., supra note 4; Roukovina v. Island F. C. Co., 16o Minn. 335, 2oo N. W.
350 (1924) ; Krocker v. Westmoreland P. Mill, 274 Pa. 143, 117 Atl. 669 (1922) ; Powell v.
Bentley, 34 W. Va. 8o4, 12 S. E. 1O85 (18gi) ; Bradley v. Gill, Lutw. 69 (i688).
10 For example, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 2o6 U. S. 23o, 27 Sup. Ct. 618
(1907), 237 U. S. 474, 35 Sup. Ct. 752 (915), 240 U. S. 65o, 36 Sup. Ct. 465 (1916);
Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 Pac. 928 (1911); Sullivan
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 Atl. 1O65 (904), 2= Pa. 72, 7o Atl. 775
(i9o8).
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The enterprises involved, in complaints concerning noise, while frequently
of local importance, are usually of moderate size and of a type that may be
operated successfully within, or upon the border of, a residential section.
On the other hand, occasionally, residential building operations spread into
a partially industrialized area. Such fluctuations seem inevitable in com-
munities still in a state of development. Zoning, while helpful, is not
decisive. It has been held recently in Massachusetts, that a zoning ordinance
which impresses an industrial character upon a neighborhood does not sanc-
tion practices not naturally incidental to ordinary and reasonable use.1 ' It
has been said that where industrial works are collected in an appropriate
locality and are prudently carried on during working hours, noise inseparable
from such enterprises must be endured by those who by choice or necessity
live in the vicinity.12  But although not entitled to the same peace and quiet
as in a district strictly residential, the householder can still insist that the
business be conducted in a reasonable manner, with due regard to his rights
as one who dwells in a manufacturing district. 1 Indeed if the law were
otherwise he could be driven from his home without redress. "One who
settles in a district, which possesses natural resources of a special kind,
cannot prohibit the development of those resources merely because it may in-
terfere in some degree with personal satisfaction or xsthetic enjoyment. No
one can move into a quarter given over to foundries and boiler shops and de-
mand the quiet of a farm. On the other hand, the noisy or noisome factory
cannot with immunity invade territory stamped by use for residence." 14
Just as in international law there must be compromises with neighbors whom
to some it would be preferable to exterminate, so in these minor conflicts
compromises that do not always meet the tests of logic are unavoidable.
Necessarily they are based on practical considerations. Highly nervous
and oversensitive persons are not afforded exceptional immunity or protec-
tion. "Equity is sometimes said to act upon the conscience of the indi-
vidual," observes a federal judge, "but that phrase does not mean that
'Beane v. H. K. Porter, Inc., 28o Mass. 538, 182 N. E. 823 (1932). Accord: Eaton
v. Klimn, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P. (2d) 678 (1933) ; Marshall v. Holbrook, 276 Mass. 341, 177
N. E. 504 (I93I).
' Monlezun v. Jahncke Dry-Docks, Inc., 163 La. 400, III So. 886 (1927) ; Lohmuller v.
Kirk, 133 Md. 78, 104 At!. 270 (1918); Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871);
Roy v. Chevrolet Car Co., 262 Mich. 663, 247 N. W. 774 (933) ; Hauser v. Kraeuter &
Co., 97 N. J. Eq. 413, 129 Atl. 473 (1925); Sparhawk v. Union Pass. Ry., 54 Pa. 401
(1867) ; Austin v. Converse, 219 Pa. 3, 67 Atl. 921 (19o7) ; Hafer v. Guyman, 7 Dist. R.
21 (Pa. 1897) ; Crossett v. Standard Ice Mfg. Co., 27 Dist. R. 26 (Pa. 1918).
'Dittman v. Repp, 50 Md. 516 (1878); Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290 (1875);
Eastcott v. Metal Craft Co., 254 Mich. 513, 236 N. W. 847 (931); Collins v. Wayne Iron
Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (igio); Quinn v. American Spring Co., 293 Pa. 152, 141
Atl. 855 (1928) ; Rushmer v. Polsue & Alfieri, Ltd., [i9o6] i Ch. 234.
' Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., mupra note 4, at 488, 1O4 N. E. at 373. See also
Nugent v. Melville Shoe Corp., 28o Mass. 469, 182 N. E. 825 (1932); Ebur v. Alloy
Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 155 Atl. 280 (1931). A right to make a noise is not ac-
quired by long user unless during the period of user the noise was an actionable nuisance.
Sturges v. Bridgman, ii Ch. D. 852 (1879).
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it will enforce the golden rule in favor of one individual, against
another, . ,, 15
As to the particular sounds that have furnished grounds for litigation,
it will be found that those produced in the fabrication of metals are most
conspicuous, owing to the pounding and hammering inseparable from such
occupations. There are many suits involving iron mills, machine shops,
forges and foundries,'- but, of course, the cases are by no means confined
to these obvious instances of unusual disturbance. Jewelers and silver-
smiths have been charged with similar nuisances.. 7  A well known decision
is the Appeal of the Ladies Decorative Art Club.' In that case the de-
fendants, who were enjoined from maintaining a nuisance, conducted a
school of industrial art, in a house which was one of a row of dwellings in
a residential section, to the discomfort of an adjoininig owner. The dis-
turbance consisted in the tapping and hammering incidental to the instruc-
tion in wood carving and metal chasing. The buzzing, whirring and grind-
ing sounds of machinery have been a frequent source of complaint when
excessive and ill timed.' 9 It is unnecessary to particularize, but printing
establishments 20 and plants for the manufacture of dairy products and ice
may be mentioned as light industries usually located dose to populous dis-
'Lord v. DeWitt, 116 Fed. 713 (19o2) ; see also Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15
N. E. 768 (1888); Coombs v. March, 7 Dist. & C. 791 (Pa. 1926); Powell v. Bentley,
supra note 9; Gaunt v. Finney, 8 Ch. App. 8 (872); Heath v. Mayor of Brighton, 98
L. T. 718 (1908). Cf. Harrison v. St. Mark's Church, 12 Phila. 259 (Pa. 1877).
11 Froelicher v. Oswald Iron; Works, iii La. 705, 35 So. 821 (19o3) ; Sardo v. James
Russell Boiler Works, 241 Mass. 215, 135 N. E. 127 (i922); Marshall v. Holbrook,
supra note ii; Beane v. H. K. Porter, Inc., supra note II; Robinson v. Baugh, supra note
13; Eastcott v. Metal Craft Co., supra note 13; Elliotson v..Feetham, 2 Bing. 134 (N. C.
1835); Ereon v. Niagara Steel Finishing Co., ioo Misc. 61g, 166 N. Y. Supp. 442
(917); Shaw v. Queen City Forging Co., 7 Ohio N. P. 255 (I9OO); Dennis v. Eckhart,
3 Grant 390 (Pa. 1862); Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, supra note I3; Beuchel v. Streng,
63 Prrrs. L. J. 393 (Pa. 1915) ; Ebur v. Alloy Metal Wire Co., supra note I4. Cf. Crem-
idas v. Fenton, 223 Mass. 249, 111 N. E. 855 (1916); Roy v. Chevrolet Car Co., supra
note I2; Hauser v. Kraeuter & Co., supra note 12; Fish v. Dodge, supra note 8; Hafer
v. Guyman, supra note 12; Austin v. Converse, supra note 12.
a'Lohmuller v. Kirk, supra note 12; Wallace v. Auer, io Phila. 356 (Pa. 1875); Blo-
men v. Barstow Co., 35 R. I. 198, 85 Atl. 924 (1913).
3B,2 W. N. C. 75, 13 AtI. 537 (Pa. 1888).
'Nailor v. Blakeslee, 167 Atl. 548 (Conn. 1933); McMorran v. Cleveland Cliff Iron
Co., :53 Mich. 65, 234 N. W. 163 (I93); Reilley v. Curley, 75 N. J. Eq. 57, 71 Atl. 70o
(I9O3); Friedman v. Keit, 113 N. J. Eq. 37 (933); Krocker v. Westmoreland Planing
Mill, supra note 9; Dillon v. Cortland Baking Co., 224 App. Div. 303, 23o N. Y. Supp.
289 (1928); Kennedy v. Frechette, 45 . I. 399, 123 Atl. 146 (I924); Chadwick v. To-
ronto, 26 ONT. WmxLY REP. 155 (1914); Bosworth-Smith v. Gwynnes, Ltd., 12 L. T. R.
i5 (I920). Cf. Damadio v. Levinsohn, supra note 9; Butterfield v. Klaber, 52 How. Pr. 255
(N. Y. 1875); Knaub v. Meyer, 141 N. Y. Supp. 819 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Miranda v. Buffalo
Gen. Elec. Co., 140 Misc. 267, 251 N. Y. Supp. 510 (1g31) ; Haber v. Paramount Icel Co.,
267 N. Y. Supp. 349 (App. Div. 1933) ; Coombs v. March, supra note 15; McCann v. Strang,
97 Wis. 551, 72 N. W. 1117 (1897); Heath v. Mayor of Brighton, mpra note 15.
'9Hustleton v. Park, 256 Pa. 255, IOO Atl. 798 (1917) ; Polsue & Alfieri, Ltd. v. Rush-
mer, [19o7] A. C. 121, aff'g [19o6] i Ch. 234, 75 L. J. Ch. 79; Hey v. Seifert & Baime,
95 N. J. Eq. 5o2, 123 Atl. io6 (1923). Cf. McCaffrey's Appeal, 105 Pa. 253 (884).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tricts. 2 1 Objections to garages and gas filling stations have been so frequent
that they call for separate treatment.2 2  In many instances it is not so much
the plant itself as the mode of operation that is objected to. Thus in
Kobielski v. Belle Isle East Side Creamery Co. 2 3 the testimony showed that
active work began shortly after midnight and continued until seven or eight
in the morning, heavily loaded auto trucks and numerous milk wagons came
and went, milk cans were thrown about and there was loud talking and some
swearing at the restless horses. The complainants who were deprived of
their sleep and unable to keep their tenants were held entitled to an injunc-
tion. Indeed, loud and profane talk, boisterous conduct and continuous
unnecessary noise are forms of disturbance easily avoided and have fre-
quently been checked by injunction or indictment.24  The blowing of a
factory whistle in the early morning hours has been held a nuisance.25  So
the noise of airplanes has been considered as one ground of annoyance in
proceedings to enjoin the use of a tract of land as an airport.26 As respects
one point, there seems to be a general agreement that noises which would
not under the circumstances be held a nuisance in the daytime may well be
declared a nuisance if made at night. The occupants of dwellings and
apartments are entitled to protection from disturbance during ordinary
'Bickley v. Morgan Utilities Co., 173 Ark. lO38, 294 S. W. 38 (1927) ; Clay County
Ice Co. v. Littlefield, 63 S. W. (2d) 530 (Ark. 1933); Mitchell v. Flynn Dairy Co., 172
Iowa 583, 154 N. W. 878 (1915); Crump v. Carnahan, 155 La. 648, 99 So. 493 (1924);
Shea v. National Ice Cream Co., 28o Mass. 206, 182 N. E. 303 (1932); Kobielski v. Belle
Isle East Side Creamery Co., 222 Mich. 656, 193 N. W. 214 (1923); O'Connor v. Jersey
Creamery Co., 263 Mich. 86, 248 N. W. 557 (1933); Roukovina v. Island Farm Cream-
ery Co., supra note 14; Hamilton v. Bates, 284 Pa. 513, 131 Atl. 369 (1925); Sturges v.
Bridgman, supra note 14. Cf. Fanshawe v. London and Provincial Dairy Co., 4 T. L. R.
694 (1888); Crossett v. Standard Ice Mfg. Co., supra note 12.
Episcopo v. Olivere, supra note 9; McPherson v. First Presbyterian Church, 120
Okla. 40, 248 Pac. 561 (1926) ; Nesbit v. Risenman, 298 Pa. 475, 148 Atl. 695 (1930) ; Scully
v. Massey, 17 Dist. & C. 363 (Pa. 1932) ; Baker v. Moore, 311 Pa. 38, 166 Atl. 362 (1933).
Cf. Sprout v. Levinson, 298 Pa. 400, 148 Atl. 511 (193o); Pierce v. Kelner, 304
Pa. 509, 156 Atl. 61 (i3i); Franklin St. M. E. Church v. Crystal Oil & Gas Co., 309
Pa. 357, 163 Atl. 91o (1932). See Ruppin, Public Garages as Nuisances per se (i932) Si
U. OF PA. L. Rav. 29.
. Supra note 21; see cases cited supra note 21.
2 Birmingham News Co. v. Little, 226 Ala. 642, 148 So. 398 (1933) (newspaper);
Commonwealth v. Oaks, 113 Mass. 8 (1873); Friedman v. Keil, supra, note 19 (bakery);
Barnard v. Finkbeiner, 162 App. Div. 319, 147 N. Y. Supp. 514 (1914) (apartment house);
People v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 165 App. Div. 711, 151 N. Y. Supp. 547 (915);
People v. Weeks, 172 App. Div. 117, 158 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1916); Attorney-General v.
Corke, lO2 L. J. Ch. 30 (1933); Innes v. Newman, [1894] 2 Q. B. 232; Bartlett v. Mar-
shall, 6o J. P. lO4 (1896) (newsdealer) ; Vanderpant v. Mayfair Hotel Co., [1930] I Ch.
138 (hotel). Cf. Leonard v. Hotel Majestic, 17 Misc. 229, 4o N. Y. Supp. lO44 (1896);
Appeal of Penrose, 14o Pa. 45, 21 AtI. 364 (i8gi).
' Hill v. McBurney, 112 Ga. 788, 38 S. E. 42 (19oo); Mackenzie v. Pauli Co., 2o7
Mich. 456, 174 N. W. 161 (1919). Contra: Redd v. Edna Cotton Mills, 136 N. C. 342, 48
S. E. 761 (1904). See alsa Daugherty v. Southern C. 0. Co., 138 Ark. 329, 211 S. W. 179
(1919).
Sweetland v. Curtis Airports Corp., 55 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932). See also
People v. Smith, 11g Misc. 294, 196 N. Y. Supp. 241 (1922), rev'd, 206 App. Div. 642; Gay
v. Taylor, 19 Dist. & C. 31 (Pa. 1933).
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sleeping hours.2 7  In some instances a less stringent rule has been applied
to temporary noises during building operations. 23  Even so, damages have
been awarded in Massachusetts against a building contractor with respect
to unnecessary noises by his workmen in the early morning.29 On the whole,
and without any change in the language of the courts, there can be detected
a tendency to require from industry an increased regard for the comfort of
the surrounding community. Improved building construction, more skillful
engineering, make this possible without imposing too heavy a burden on
essential activities.
A few cases concern hospitals. Although conducted as a gainful occu-
pation, the hospital is charitable in spirit and essential to the practice of
modern medicine. Nevertheless, a hospital must be conducted with due
regard to the comfort and health of others. Even when as a charitable
institution it may not be subject to an action at law, it may still be enjoined
from maintaining a nuisance.30  A court of equity may require a hospital
so to arrange its internal construction as not to distress its neighbors by
exposing them to the groans and moans of the operating room. 31  So, in a
recent New York case, a private hospital for alcoholics and drug addicts
was enjoined from disturbing the neighborhood by failing to control the
cries and screams of the patients.
32
Whether the keeping and breeding of animals is regarded as an in-
dustry or a sport, the obviously proper place for it, as regards both the
creatures themselves and the neighbors, is in the great open spaces made
familiar by the motion pictures. But one may be of a sociable disposition,
and a lover not only of pets but of his fellow men. It is also an advantage
to be close to one's market, even at the risk of annoying some, who under
no circumstances could be conceived of as customers. The barking of dogs
has frequently led to litigation. The dog is a noisy animal and is valued on
that account. As put by the judge in the lower court in a Colorado case:
"To some ears the barking of a dog, especially on the person's own premises,
'Wheat Culvert Co., Inc. v. Jenkins, 246 Ky. 319, 55 S. W. (2d) 4 (1932) ; Deevers
v. Land, 22o Mo. App. 50, 285 S. W. 746 (1926) ; Friedman v. Keil, Supra note 19; Selig-
man v. Victor Talking M. Co., 71 N J. Eq. 697, 63 AtI. 1O93 (i9o6); Shea v. National
Ice Cream Co., Inc., supra note 21; Andrews v. Perry, 127 Misc. 320, 216 N. Y. Supp,.
537 (1926); Yocum v. Hotel St. George, 18 Abb. N. C. 340 (N. Y. 1887); Collins v.
Wayne Iron Works, supra note 13; Robin v. Kolb, 88 Pa. Super. 8o (1926); Stetter v.
Reliable Silk Mfg. Co., 42 LAic. L. Ray. 369 (Pa. 1930); De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd.
v. Spicer Bros., Ltd., 3o T. L. R. 257 (1914). Relief was refused in Monlezun v. Jahncke
Dry-Docks, Inc., supra note 12. The disturbance of night workers by daytime noises does not
seem to justify interference. Attorney-General v. Doremus, supra note 4.
' Phelps v. Mayor, [1916] 2 Ch. 255; Clark v. Lloyds Bank, Ltd., 103 L. T. 211
(191o); Lord v. DeWitt, supra note 15.
2 Nugent v. Melville Shoe Co., supra note 14.
' Herr v. Central Ky. Lunatic Asylum, 97 Ky. 458, 30 S. W. 971 (1895). See gen-
erally Notes (1919) 4 A. L. R. 995, (1922) iS A. L. R. iig.
'Kestner v. Homeopathic M. & S. Hospital, _2 Dist. R. 793 (Pa. 1911); Deaconess
Home v. Bontjes, 207 Ill. 553, 69 N. E. 748 (964), aff'g 1O4 Ill. App. 484 (1902).
'Keenly v. McCarty, 137 Misc. 524, 244 N. Y. Supp. 63 (193o). Cf. Heaton v. Packer,
131 App. Div. 812, 116 N. Y. Supp. 46 (1909).
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is a sound that is pleasing and one which tends to make him feel secure."
But the Supreme Court in that case took a less indulgent view of the de-
fendant's conduct in maintaining in the suburbs of a city a kennel and dog
hospital with accommodations for ninety-three dogs which howled and
barked day and night continuously, disturbing and keeping awake the plain-
tiff, his wife and children, rendering them nervous and irritable and de-
priving them of the proper enjoyment of their home, and reversed the
judgment for defendant with directions to grant an injunction unless the
nuisance was discontinued. 33  Indeed there are circumstances under which
the barking of a single dog may be a nuisance.34 But dogs are far from
being the only animals whose noise has called for judicial intervention. In
Singer v. James3' the plaintiff, whose residence was a mile and a half from
Baltimore, was held entitled to an injunction restraining the defendant from
keeping such a great number of fowls, hogs and dogs that their noise de-
prived the plaintiff and his family of the comfortable enjoyment of their
dwelling house. Constant noise from the stamping and kicking of horses
in an adjoining stable has resulted in an injunction."6 The bleating of
calves day and night at a slaughter house to the annoyance of an adjoining
owner has been suppressed; - a city ordinance forbidding the keeping of
goats within a fixed distance of a dwelling has been held reasonable.38 On
the other hand, the lessee of a hotel in a borough was unsuccessful in re-
straining an adjoining owner from keeping game cocks and chickens that
disturbed his guests by loud crowing from one to five in the morning. Said
the court, with a martyr's resignation: "There are numberless noises and
inconveniences which are not conductive to perfect rest, but all these are
the music of the night, and while silently bearing with them, we must at
times close our windows and keep out or deaden the disturbing sounds, if
we would hope for partial quietude." 3' In one case, the noisy presence of
'Krebs v. Hermann, go Colo. 61, 6 P. (2d) 9o7 (I93I), Note (1932) 79 A. L. R.
1054, io66. Accord: Kansas v. Stillwell, 114 Kan. 8o8, 220 Pac. io58 (1923); Chambers
v. Walker, 57 Pnrs. L. J. 210 (Pa. 19o9); Herring v. Wilton, io6 Va. 171, 55 S. E. 546
(19o6). Cf. Street v. Tugwell (i8oo), 2 SELw. N. P. (9th ed. 1838) 1138; Heylman v. Dist.
of Columbia, 27 App. D. C. 563 (19o6).
'Force v. Dahn, io N. J. L. J. 252 (1887) ; Hechelman v. Kindt, 22 Dist. R. 791 (Pa.
1911). But see Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn. 121 (1862) ; Seegmueller v. Palmer, 9 Ohio
C. C. (N. s.) 333 (1907). As to shooting dogs cf. Hubbard v. Preston, go Mich. 221, 51
N. W. 209 (1892); Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend. 354 (N. Y, i84O), with Jacquay v. Hart-
zell, I Ind. App. 500 (1891); Bowers v. Horen, 93 Mich. 420, 53 N. W. 535 (1892). See
also Strong v. Georgia Ry. & E. Co., 118 Ga. 515, 45 S. E. 366 (1903), for kind words
as to dogs.
i3o 1Md. 382, ioO At. 642 (1917).
Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. D. 692 (1876) ; Ball v. Ray, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 467 (1873).
See action on case Dargan v. Waddell, 9 Tred. 244 (N. C. 1848). Cf. Haughton v. Ken-
drick, 285 Pa. 223, 132 Atl. 166 (1926).
'Bishop v. Banks, 33 Conn. 118 (1865).
'In re Matthews, 19I Cal. 35, 214 Pac. 981 (1923) ; see 58 Cal. App. 649 (1922). Cf.
Ex parte Von Koenneritz, 97 Tex. Cr. R. 294, 261 S. W. 570 (1924).
' Hillegas v. Reinhart, 2o LANC. L. Rav. 137, 140 (Pa. 19o3). See also Higgins v.
Decarah Produce Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N. W. lo9, 81 A. L. R. 1199 (1932); Hunt v.
W. H. Cook, Ltd., (1922) 66 Sol- J. 557.
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crickets in a leased apartment was set up as a constructive eviction, unsuc-
cessfully it is true; 40 but the proposition is an indication of the effect that
seemingly slight disturbances may have upon irritated nerves. In the animal
noise cases the locality of the disturbance is no doubt an important factor
in determining the question of nuisance; but, as in other types of annoy-
ance, it is not necessarily the deciding factor. In several of the most im-
portant cases cited above, the contending parties resided in small towns or
city suburbs.
Where the disturbing sounds have their origin in enterprises connected
with public entertainment or sport, one would expect that a more exacting
standard of conduct would be imposed than for vital economic services.
Such is the view of the New Jersey Court of Chancery: ". . . in consid-
ering whether a noise amounts to a nuisance," says Vice-Chancellor Pitney,
"the question whether or not it is made for a necessary or useful purpose
is always taken into consideration." 41 So, in a suit to restrain the opera-
tion of a roller skating rink, when it was suggested that louder noises were
made by passing trains, trolley cars and automobiles, the court pointedly
observed that these were necessities, while the present case related to a private
business in no sense a public necessity.42 But as a rule, the cases do not
avowedly stress the relative importance of the source of disturbance, what-
ever it may be, where substantial injury is inflicted upon the complaining
party. This may reflect the modern attitude toward recreation, as compared
with the older tendency to look with suspicion on any sort of entertainment
for the public outside of military exercises and traditional festivals. Some
forms of amusement have long been under the ban of the law. The gaming
house and the bawdy house are nuisances per se, although conducted with
an outward appearance of decorum.43  At common law a stage for rope
dancers and a bowling alley were indictable as common nuisances. Rope
dancers have left the highways for vaudeville, and as for bowling alleys,
they are hardly any longer to be regarded as evil haunts "from their tendency
" Ben Har Holding Corp. v. Fox, 147 Misc. 300, 263 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1933). Un-
fortunately the tenant was a tuba player. "It is singular," said the court, "that a musician
should complain about another musician." Id. at 307, 263 N. Y. Supp. at 702.
"Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 27, 53 AtI. 289 (I9O3), quoted
in Riffey v. Rush, 51 N. D. i88, 199 N. W. 523 (1924).
'First M. E. Church v. Cape May G. & C. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 257, 67 Atl. 613 (907).
See other rink cases: Manos v. City of Seattle, 24 P. (2d) 91 (Wash. 1933) ; Snyder v.
Cabell, 29 W. Va. 48, i S. E. 241 (1886) ; Churchwardens of the Church of St. Margaret v.
Stephens, 29 Ont. L. R. 18o (1898).
"Barnett v. Tedescki, 154 Ala. 474, 45 So. 904 (19o8) ; De Forest v. United States,
II App. D. C. 458 (897) ; Commonwealth v. Godall, 165 Mass. 588, 43 N. E. 52o (1896) ;
People v. Elmore, 256 N. Y. 489, 177 N. E. 14 (1931); Commonwealth v. Ciccone, 85 Pa.
Super. 316 (1925). Drawing together great numbers of disorderly persons, to the incon-
venience of the neighborhood, a practice referred to by Hawkins in i PLEAxS OF THE CROWNX
(1716) 198, has, through the reluctant efforts of the police urged on by reformers, almost
disappeared. Only an occasional road house preserves the manners of ruder days. Roulette
is not as noisy as a radio and a more sophisticated younger generation would rather live
next door to a strumpet than a trumpet. Still the morals must be preserved of those who
cannot get away to the Riviera.
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to withdraw the young and inconsiderate from any useful employment".4 4
Some early American decisions support the old and stern doctrine; 4' but
the prevailing opinion today is that a bowling alley is not a nuisance per se,
although like other noisy forms of recreation, it may in fact be held a
nuisance on account of its location or the manner in which it is conducted. 46
The disturbance of residents by organized sports or amusements may
result either from sounds originating in the activities themselves, or from
the almost inevitable noise of the attending throngs. In Walker v.
Brewster 47 a property owner was enjoined from permitting his grounds to
be used for what were described as monster fftes, with displays of fire-
works. There was music by bands and dancing and, of course, crowds of
spectators. The court pointed out the difference between private entertain-
ment and the business of giving entertainments and collecting crowds. The
case is the precursor of many others seeking to restrain the noisy operation
of various types of amusement parks and picnic grounds.48  "When people
came to be amused [in swings and roundabouts]," observed the court in
one case, "one's ordinary experience told one they would shout; it was a
necessary consequence of their mode of enjoying themselves. There was
nothing improper in it, but it could not be permitted to interfere with
peoples' comfort." 4 Roller coasters, with their combination of noisy
apparatus and excitable riders, have been a frequent source of complaint. 50
"State v. Haines, 3o Me. 65 (1849). See Jacob Hall's Case, i Mod. 76 (1671);
i HAWKINS, op. cit. supra note 43, at 693.
Bloomhuff v. State, 8 Blackf. 2o5 (Ind. 1846) ; State v. Haines, stpra note 44; Tan-
ner v. Trustees of Albion, 5 Hill 121 (N. Y. 1843); Updike v. Campbell, 4 E. D. Smith
570 (N. Y. 1855).
"City of Shreveport v. Liederkrantz Soc., 13o La. 8ow, 58 So. 578, 4o L. R. A. (N. s.)
75 (1912); Hamilton Corp. v. Julian, 130 Md. 597, ioi At. 558 (1917); State v. Hall,
32 N. J. L. I58 (1867) ; Peragallo v. Luner, 99 N. J. Eq. 726, 133 Atl. 543 (1926) ; Pape
v. Pratt Inst., 127 App. Div. 147, 111 N. Y. Supp. 354 (igo8); Briggs v. Vottler, 4 W. N.
C. 272 (Pa. 1877) ; Morey v. Black, 21 Montg. Co. io2 (Pa. 1904) ; Spano v. Duke, 23 Del.
Co. 513 (Pa. i931). Happily for bench and bar golf is not a nuisance per se. Gleason v.
Hillcrest Golf Course, Inc., 148 Misc. 246, 265 N. Y. Supp. 886 (933).
"L. R. 5 Eq. 25 (1867).
Phelps v. Winch, 309 Ill. 158, 14o N. E. 847, 28 A. L. RL 1169 (1923) ; Off v. Exposi-
tion Coaster, Inc., 336 Ill. ioo, 124 N. E. 472 (1929) ; Palestine B. Assn. v. Minor, 27 Ky.
L. R. 781, 86 S. W. 695 (905); Commonwealth v. Cincinnati, etc. R. R., 139 Ky. 429, 112
S. W. 613 (19o8); Edmunds v. Duff, 280 Pa. 355 (1924) ; Turtle v. Fitchett, I56 Wash. 328,
287 Pac. 7 (1930); Inchbald v. Robinson, 4 Ch. App. 388 (1869) (circus) ; Becker v. Earls'
Court, Ltd., 56 SoL J. 73 (1911); Bedford v. Leeds Corp., 77 J. P. 430 (1913). Cf.,
injunction refused: Burroughs v. City of Dallas, 276 Fed. 812 (C. C. A. 5th, I921) ; Pfingst
v. Sen, 94 Ky. 556, 23 S. W. 358 (1893) ; Iford v. Nickel, i S. W. (2d) 751 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928) ; Hornsby v. Crystal Beach Park, 41 S. W. (2d) 82 (Tex. Civ. App. I931) ; see
Village of Des Plaines v. Poyer, 123 Ill. 348, 14 N. E. 677 (1888); Germaine v. London
Exhibitions, Ltd., 75 L. T. 1OI (1896).
"Winter v. Baker, 3 T. L. R. 569, 570 (1887). See also Lambton v. Mellish, [1894] 3
Ch. D. 163.
' Schlueter v. Billingheimer, 9 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 513 (1885); Edmunds v. Duff,
supra note 48; see cases cited supra note 48, and Note (1924) 33 A. L. R. 725. A merry-go-
round was enjoined in Town of Davis v. Davis, 40 W. Va. 464, 21 S. E. 906 (1895). In
Attorney-General v. Doremus, supra note 4, an injunction to restrain trap shooting was re-
fused.
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Athletic clubs have been restrained from disturbing a residential neighbor-
hood by boxing contests at night that drew crowds and caused noise and
confusion. 5' On the other hand the court need not anticipate that nuisance
will result from the mere fact that a number of people will assemble at a
particular spot, as in the case of an open air tabernacle 52 or auditorium.
5 3
In an Irish case race meetings on Sunday were enjoined where the shouting
and cheering of the crowds and the cries of the bookmakers disturbed the
quiet enjoyment of suburban homes and interfered with church services.' 4
And in this country a similar principle has been applied, although not uni-
formly, to Sunday baseball.55 The game, however, is not a nuisance per se
and under ordinary circumstances injury must be shown.5" So also a dance
hall is not a nuisance per se, although it may become a nuisance from the
manner in which it is conducted and from the behavior of the persons
assembled in and around it.57  "Among the noises," it has been said, "which,
if they do not cause substantial discomfort, residents in large industrial
cities may have to put up with, is a certain amount of the noise which ac-
companies and is incident to the reasonable recreation of a crowded popula-
tion. In the fashionable quarter of a city a similar discomfort is experienced
at certain seasons, and, within due limits, may have to be submitted to." 58
The miniature golf course, which came and went so quickly, has left re-
minders that even so mild a form of entertainment may in its operation
become objectionable to nearby residents.59 An instructive case is Ackers
' Russell v. Nostrand Athletic Club, Inc., 212 App. Div. 543, 209 N. Y. Supp. 76 (1925);
Bellamy v. Wells, 6o L. J. Ch. 156 (1891).
Murphy v. Cupp, 182 Ark. 334, 31 S. W. (2d) 396 (193o).
Sheets v. Armstrong, 3o7 Pa. 385, I6I Atl. 359 (1932). See also Jones v. Little Rock
Boys' Club, 182 Ark. 1050, 34 S. W. (2d) 222 (1931) (recreation center) ; Briggs v. City
of Grand Rapids, 261 Mich. 1I, 245 N. W. 555 (1932) (football field) ; City of Lynchburg
v. Peters, 145 Va. I, 133 S. E. 674 (1926) (stadium).
"Dewar v. City & Suburban Racecourse Co., [I899] I Ir. R. 345.
' Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., supra note 41; Seastream v. New Jersey Ex-
hibition Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 178, 58 AtI. 532 (1904) (injunction granted); McMillan v.
Kuehnle, 78 N. J. Eq. 251, 78 At. 185 (9No) (injunction refused). Where a nuisance oc-
curs it makes no difference that the enjoyment of the property interfered with is religious
and devotional. Churchwardens of the Church of St. Margaret v. Stephens, supra note 42.
' Alexander v. Tebeau, 24 Ky. L. R. 1305, 71 S. W. 427 (19o3) ; Cronin v. Bloemecke,
58 N. J. Eq. 313, 43 Atl. 6o5 (1899) ; Riffey v. Rush, supra note 41; Peden v. Furman Uni-
versity, 155 S. C. 1, 151 S. E. 9o7 (193o) ; Royse Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Reinhardt, I59 S. W.
Ioio (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
' McPheeters v. McMahon, 21 P. (2d) 6o6 (Cal. App. 1933); Whitcomb v. Vigeant,
240 Mass. 359, 134 N. E. 241, ig A. L. R. 1439 (1922) ; Thoenebe v. Mosby, 257 Pa. i, ioi
Atl. 98 (917) ; Truehart v. Parker, 257 S. W. 64o (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; Cain v. Truehart,
12 S. W. (2d) 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; Tarr v. Hopewell Community Club, 153 Wash.
214, 279 Pac. 594 (I929). Cf. Commonwealth v. Cardoze, iig Mass. 210 (1875) ; Linden v.
Fischer, 191 N. W. 9Ol (Minn. 1923) ; People v. Rubenfeld, 254 N. Y. 245, 172 N. Y. Supp.
485 (1930).
t3 New Imperial and Windsor Hotel Co. v. Johnson, [I912] I Ir. R. 327, 336.
0 Central Trust and Savings Co. v. Mencke, 14 Dist. & C. 115 (Pa. 1930) ; Gottschall
v. McIlhenny, 36 Dauph. Co. 366 (Pa. 1931). Cf. Drennen v. Mason, 133 So. 689 (Ala. ig3i) ;
Rickard v. Feinstone, 14 Dist. & C. 114 (Pa. 193o) (injunction to restrain construction re-
fused).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
v. Marsh,6 ° where the gentle game of croquet came under the scrutiny of
the court. The bill was to restrain the playing of this game on a vacant
lot opposite the complainants' residence in the city of Washington during
the evening, not later than I i P. M. A decree granting, an injunction was
reversed on appeal in a well considered opinion which found the com-
plainants unduly sensitive.
An approach to the cases concerned with music is complicated by the
embariassing question, what is music? Perhaps it is best to avoid the
always delicate problem of art as did Mr. Justice Kekewich. Whether
classical music was more distracting than works of a lower class, he could
not say.61 Lord Selbourne has summed up the common sense view: "A
nuisance by noise (supposing malice to be out of question) is emphatically
a question of degree. If my neighbor builds a house against a party wall,
next to my own, and I hear through the wall more than is agreeable to me
of the sounds from his nursery or his music-room, it does not follow (even
if I am nervously sensitive or in infirm health) that I can bring an action
or obtain an injunction. Such things to offend against the law must be
done in a manner which, beyond fair controversy, ought to be regarded as
exceptive and unreasonable." 62 A wilful and malicious disturbance by
loud noises is actionable, as it should be.6" But that does not mean that
popular songs may not be sung in a private residence or club, although
unappreciated by the listeners, in the absence of malicious or disorderly
conduct.64 The giving of music lessons by a teacher of music even when
supplemented by practice on such instruments as the piano and violin and
singing, has been held not such an annoyance as to entitle an adjoining
resident to an injunction.65 But in one instance an injunction was granted
to restrain vocal music on the premises of a manufacturer and dealer in
musical instruments which disturbed an adjoining business.66 The Salva-
tion Army has not come off as well as the teachers, owing to municipal
regulation of street music, 67 although in one case it was said that the use
of the streets contemplates not quiet and repose but the noise and bustle
i App. D. C. 28 (1901).
"Motion v. Mills, 13 T. L. R. 427 (1897).
'Gaunt v. Finney, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 8, 12 (1872). See also Lord Justice Mellish in
Ball v. Ray, supra note 36, "not . . . like the noise of -a pianoforte . . . or . .
children in their nursery, which are noises we must reasonably expect."
Shellabarger v. Morris, 115 Mo. App. 566 (19o5). "A great noise in the night-time,
made by the human, voice or by blowing a trumpet, is a nuisance to those near whom it is
made." Bankus v. State, 4 Ind. 114, 116 (853) ; Rex v. Smith, 2 Strange 704 (725). But
cf. Owen v. Herman, I W. & S. 348 (Pa. 1841) (disturbance of worshipper in church by
loud singing not actionable).
" Miller v. Jersey Coasts Resorts Corp., 98 N. J. Eq. 289, 13o Atl. 824 (1925).
'Tonnelle v. Hayes, ii8 Misc. 339, 194 N. Y. Supp. I81 (1922); Christie v. Davey,
[1893] I Ch. 316; Pope v. Peate, 7 Ont. L. R. 2o7 (I9O4).
"Motion v. Mills, supra note 61. The plaintiffs were, among other things, auctioneers.
"Wilkesbarte v. Garebed, 9 Kulp, 273 (Pa. 1898); Commonwealth v. Krubeck, 8 Dist.
R. 521 (Pa. 1899); Anonymous, 77 J. P. 256 (1913).
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incident to the transaction of business and the harmless pleasures and devo-
tions of the people.68  Whether bells may be classed with musical instru-
ments is a question upon which opinions may differ. At least they have
tonality, ritual significance, and in some cases practical value, as on fire
engines and alarm clocks. The leading case is Soltau v. DeHeld.0  There
a chime of bells, that had been installed on the roof of a house converted
into a chapel, was rung five times on weekdays and more frequently on
Sundays, to the disturbance and annoyance of the complainant and his
family. An injunction was granted, and the same principle has been applied
in other cases of chimes and church bells as well as bells used for secular
purposes where the ringing has been unreasonable and unusual.70  In Cluney
v. Lee WVai 71 an injunction was granted to restrain the use of objectionable
musical instruments in a Chinese theatre during hours that interfered with
sleep. The orchestra included gongs, drums and wind instruments, and
the music was described as harsh, strident and discordant. This would rule
out most contemporary compositions; but such works are seldom heard
except by those who pay for the privilege in sanctuaries devoted to the art.
Not the music itself but the mode of production is the true source of
complaint in numerous cases where mechanical means are depended on for
the production of a continuous volume of tuneful sounds as a means of
enlivening pleasures that might otherwise prove monotous, and, perhaps
more often, as a method of attracting customers to the scene of revelry.
The continual operation of steam organs and other loud instruments to the
discomfort of nearby residents has frequently been enjoined. 72  In Winter
v. Baker 73 it was said that the organ was a good organ but its goodness
was in its loudness. In Lambton v. Mellish 74 the organ could be heard a
mile. That is much too far. The ingenuity of modem advertising has its
trials as well as its seductions. Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co.
7
5
is a leading case. The defendant placed in his doorway a talking machine
'In re Gribben, 5 Okla. 379, 47 Pac. lO74 (1897). See also Regina v. Nunn, io Ont.
Pr. 395 (1884).
Supra note 2.
' Appeal of St. Mark's Church, 34 LEG. INT. 222 (Pa. 1877), aff'g Harrison v. St.
Mark's Church, supra note 15, and see the same case in 17 Phila. 87 (Pa. 1883). See fur-
ther, Davis v. Sawyer, 133 Mass. 289 (1882) ; Leete v. Pilgrim Congregational Soc., 14 Mo.
App. 590 (1883) ; Terhune v. Methodist Episcopal Church, 87 N. J. Eq. 195, 100 Atl. 342
(1917) ; People v. Hess, 110 Misc. 76, 17!g N. Y. Supp. 734 (I92O). Cf. Hardman v. Hol-
berton, W. N., Dec. 8, 1866, at 379 (injunction refused nervous plaintiff who objected to clock
chiming quarter hours) ; Rogers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N. E. 768 (1888) (plaintiff
thrown into convulsions by loud noises).
nIo Hawaii 319 (1896).
"Feeney v. Bartoldo, 3o Atl. i1OI (N. J. Eq. 1895) (piano) ; Osthaus v. Robinson, 12
Dist. R. 25 (Pa. 19o2) ; Grantham v. Gibson, 41 Wash. 125, 83 Pac. 14 (1905) (orchestrion) ;
Town of Davis v. Davis, supra note 50 (band); Winter v. Baker, 3 T. L. R. 569 (1887) ;
Spruzen v. Dossett, 12 T. L. R. 246 (1896) ; Bedford v. Leeds Corporation, supra note 48;
Lambton v. Mellish, stepra note 49 (organs).
' Supra note 72.
7"Supra note 49.
724I Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251 (1922).
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operated by an electric motor which was played from io A. M. until 5 P. M.
or later, the records consisting of every variety, singing, speaking and
instrumental. The continuous and monotonous playing, which was found
to be a substantial addition to the other noises of the street, injuriously
affected the plaintiffs and their employees, in their place of business im-
mediately opposite, by gradual wear on their nervous systems and by mak-
ing it difficult for them to concentrate on their work. An injunction was
granted restraining the defendants from playing in the entrance of their
store any records on a talking machine in such a manner as to cause the
noise produced to be "appreciably audible or heard" in any part of the
respective places of business of the plaintiffs. Damages were also awarded.
Upon a subsequent violation of the injunction the defendants were fined
for contempt. 76 In a recent Texas case 77 an injunction was sought against
the defendant who operated a root beer stand in a manner considered ob-
jectionable by the plaintiff, whose home was on the opposite side of the
street. Among various nuisances it was alleged that a radio was main-
tained at all hours of the day and night. The court below, among other
things, perpetually enjoined the defendant from using a radio, and this
was one of the errors for which judgment was reversed. "Clearly," said
the court, "a radio is not a nuisance per se. The record shows that prac-
tically every residence and each of the other places of business surrounding
appellant's root beer stand is equipped with or has a radio. We do not hold
that a radio cannot be so operated that it would not become a nuisance or
that a court could not require a party to so operate his radio that it would
not be a nuisance. The fact, however, that the radio was being operated as
a nuisance would not authorize the trial court to absolutely prohibit its
use." That cases dealing with the noise of loudspeakers are few may be
attributed in part to the novelty of these instruments and the rapid progress
of their development, and in part to a tendency to correct such abuses as
may occur through penalties imposed by municipal ordinances.78
In this too brief survey of the decisions bearing on nuisances resulting
from excessive noises of various sorts, many interesting judgments that
deserve extended comment are relegated to the notes, as well as other cases
that invite criticism. Enough has been said to show the general trend of
authority. Courts of equity are not so slow as they once were to interfere
for the prevention of tortious conduct. Criticism of the law's delay has
had its effect. In the nuisance cases generally, the fatalism that once
found discomfort the ordinary mortal lot, is giving place to an insistence
that engineering skill shall be applied to reduce to the utmost the annoyances
incidental to modern life. Legal standards of what should be regarded as
'' Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 247 Mass. 6o, 141 N. E. 569 (1923).
'Weber v. Mann, 42 S. W. (2d) 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
I DAvis, RADIO LAW (1930) Pt. I, C. 4.
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ordinary and reasonable comfort improve, as the standard of living rises,
and life becomes more civilized. It is curious that until very recently
no scientific effort was made to determine the incidence of noise and its
effect on health. An eminent judge has said: "That the subjection of a
human being to a continued hearing of loud noises tends to shorten life is,
I think, beyond all doubt." 7' But a standard work of reference says:
"The usual assumption that noise is harmful to man is by no means proved.
Noise is known to affect the human heartbeat as well as the rate at which
heat energy is set free in the human body, but the details of these effects
have not been studied. Most individuals accustom themselves to living
and working in noisy surroundings and only nervous individuals who fail
to make this adjustment suffer harmful effects." so This would seem an
understatement, but such problems are now the subject of inquiry in various
laboratories of psychology. Recent medical opinion holds that the effect
of noise on the nervous system is a constant drain on nervous energy
leading to neurasthenia and breakdown. Fortunately, one community has
made a thorough effort to investigate the problem, and the report of the
commission appointed by the Commissioner of Health to study noise in
New York City and to develop means to abate it is a document deserving
the careful attention of all who are interested in municipal welfare."'
Scientific noise measurements were taken in many parts of the city and
questionnaires were furnished to persons who wished to take part in the
survey. Traffic, radios, collections and deliveries, whistles and bells, con-
struction and vocal disturbances all had their part, and while it is not pos-
sible to eliminate many of the noises of a busy city, they can be considerably
reduced by better management where sound is inevitable, and discouraged
when wholly unnecessary by municipal ordinance, as in the case of radios
and sound devices used for advertising. The problem of the privately
owned radio with loud speaker is concededly different. The radio is a new
toy, an escape from boredom; youth beats time with its foot, and the
lonely woman hears a man's voice. But like all new toys it is used at first
with too much abandon, as some may remember was the case with the
automobile in the days of the "scorcher". Just as in the case of the barking
dog and the noisy party, the annoyance is usually too petty for formal, and
expensive proceedings in equity, and ought, in all reason, to be settled by
mutual concessions and neighborly good will. This perhaps may be difficult
where apartment house faces apartment house, each with its concealed
" Pitney, V. C., in Gilbough v. West Side Amusement Co., supra note 41. Quoted with
approval by Farmer, C. J., in Phelps v. Winch, supra note 48. In the latter case "The music
was furnished by four college boys with a piano, saxophone, banjo and drum, and was the
character of music suited to present-day methods of dancing, called 'jazz' music". Id. at i61,
14o N. E. at 848.
I6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (14th ed.) 480, tit., Noise and its Control.
CiTy NoIsE (New York, 193o) Report of the Noise Abatement Commission.
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battery of horns belching trite songs and oleaginous sales talks. But if
selfish and obstinate persons insist on disturbing the neighborhood, the
burden of equity proceedings ought not to be imposed on the injured resi-
dents, but the nuisance should be dealt with by municipal ordinance and a
small fine, as has been found the only practical method of coping with
violations of traffic rules. Much of this noise is the result of mere thought-
lessness, and the broadcasting stations by occasionally advising their patrons
to turn their radios down low in the late evening, could do their part in
retaining popular good will for an industry now enjoying the advantages
of novelty, but bound sooner or later to come in for its share of regulation.
All disturbing noises are not city noises by any means. In the deep country
a few owls can give a pretty fair imitation of a radio concert and the early
barnyard noises rival those of the ash collectors and other harbingers of
dawn. Exceptionally nervous persons, or those whose refinement exceeds
the standards of "the American people in their present state of enlighten-
ment", as the Washington court put it, must seek refuge in sound proof
rooms, if they can afford them, or take their chances of the padded cell.
Indeed, air and sound conditioned houses may be the next luxury, when
luxury is resumed, to the profit of our inventors and engineers, who, having
devoted one century to creating pandemonium, may spend the next century
in abating it.
